

# **Bosnia and Herzegovina**

## **Mid-Term Evaluation**

**Thematic window: Culture & Development**

**Programme Title: Improving Cultural Understanding in  
Bosnia and Herzegovina**

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## **Prologue**

The current mid-term evaluation report is part of the efforts being implemented by the Millennium Development Goal Secretariat (MDG-F), as part of its monitoring and evaluation strategy, to promote learning and to improve the quality of the 128 joint programs in 8 development thematic windows according to the basic evaluation criteria inherent to evaluation; relevance, efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability.

The aforementioned mid-term evaluations have been carried out amidst the backdrop of an institutional context that is both rich and varied, and where several UN organizations, working hand in hand with governmental agencies and civil society, cooperate in an attempt to achieve priority development objectives at the local, regional, and national levels. Thus the mid-term evaluations have been conducted in line with the principles outlined in the Evaluation network of the Development Assistant Committee (DAC) - as well as those of the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG). In this respect, the evaluation process included a reference group comprising the main stakeholders involved in the joint programme, who were active participants in decisions making during all stages of the evaluation; design, implementation, dissemination and improvement phase.

The analysis contained in the mid-term evaluation focuses on the joint program at its mid-term point of implementation- approximately 18 months after it was launched. Bearing in mind the limited time period for implementation of the programs (3 years at most), the mid-term evaluations have been devised to serve as short-term evaluation exercises. This has limited the scope and depth of the evaluation in comparison to a more standard evaluation exercise that would take much longer time and resources to be conducted. Yet it is clearly focusing on the utility and use of the evaluation as a learning tool to improve the joint programs and widely disseminating lessons learnt.

This exercise is both a first opportunity to constitute an independent "snapshot" of progress made and the challenges posed by initiatives of this nature as regards the 3 objectives being pursued by the MDG-F; the change in living conditions for the various populations vis-à-vis the Millennium Development Goals, the improved quality in terms of assistance provided in line with the terms and conditions outlined by the Declaration of Paris as well as progress made regarding the reform of the United Nations system following the "Delivering as One" initiative.

As a direct result of such mid-term evaluation processes, plans aimed at improving each joint program have been drafted and as such, the recommendations contained in the report have now become specific initiatives, seeking to improve upon implementation of all joint programs evaluated, which are closely monitored by the MDG-F Secretariat.

Conscious of the individual and collective efforts deployed to successfully perform this mid-term evaluation, we would like to thank all partners involved and to dedicate this current document to all those who have contributed to the drafting of the same and who have helped it become a reality (members of the reference group, the teams comprising the governmental agencies, the joint program team, consultants, beneficiaries, local authorities, the team from the Secretariat as well as a wide range of institutions and individuals from the public and private sectors). Once again, our heartfelt thanks.

The analysis and recommendations of this evaluation report do not necessarily reflect the views of the MDG-F Secretariat.

## Executive report

This is a rapid assessment evaluation that seeks to identify the best practices and lessons learned from the programme as well as generate knowledge that could be adapted suitably and applied to other programmes.

This evaluation has followed a six-step process: (1) engaging stakeholders and conducting a brief needs assessment; (2) describing the programme and validating the evaluation framework with the main users; (3) refining the evaluation framework and designing data collection tools; (4) gathering credible evidence; (5) consolidating data and writing the report; (6) sharing the draft report with the main users for feedback then finalization.

During the evaluation, the following research tools and data sources were used:

- **Preliminary needs assessment with management and staff:** Telephone consultations with four key staff helped to shape the evaluation design.
- **Desk review:** For a full list of all documents reviewed please refer to Annex 1.
- **Stakeholder map:** We used a stakeholder map to identify and classify the partners and staff members involved with the programme. The map served two purposes: it provided a snapshot of the range of partners; and was used to select potential interview and survey respondents.
- **In-depth informant interviews and workshops:** The evaluation team conducted semi-structured interviews, either one to one or in small groups with 36 key informants whose selection was based on the stakeholder map.
- **Debriefings:** The evaluation team conducted a debriefing workshop with all evaluation reference group of the project to present the preliminary findings at the end of the field mission. We also had a debriefing session with the Secretariat of the MDG-F.
- **Online survey:** To ensure that a wide spectrum of views was represented, and to collect more quantitative responses, a web survey was conducted to all identified stakeholders. We got a 44% response rate.
- **Basic Efficiency Resource (BER) analysis<sup>1</sup>:** To provide a perspective on those products or activities which were perceived as most or least effective.

## *Main Findings*

### Design

- The entire formulation process should be highly remarked. The programme was designed around the areas of expertise provided by the implementing UN agencies and enriched by the participatory contribution of the government partners. Within a complex institutional architecture of the country, this process was an instrumental key to ownership and strong engagement of national and local governments.
- The programme was overwhelmingly perceived by the government as being aligned with the political priorities of BiH both at the local and at the state/entity level and the objectives and indicators were fully understood.

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<sup>1</sup> Model developed by Eva Otero & Dr. Brian Cugelman, 2009

- At a local level the 10 core municipalities participating in the programme used the opportunity at their disposal to identify and design local projects which kept with their own local priorities within the cultural sector.
- In general terms the national ownership is excellent. However, for the educational component of the programme, according to a number of relevant interviewees, there is still room for progress despite the good efforts that has already been made.
- The programme was perceived by all national partners as “first of a kind”. It was appreciated as the first time international development had primarily focused on cultural development beyond cultural heritage.
- There is a broad consensus that the programme is strongly linked and contributing to the EU accession process. It is less obvious the link of the programme with the MDGs.
- Most informants identified as the key objective of the programme either “improving intercultural understanding” as improving the country’s intercultural dynamics or “developing cultural industries” in BiH. Rarely an informant would state that the project was actually about both and only occasionally they saw the connection between them.
- There is an adequate understanding among stakeholders about what “culture for development” means and about what the concept potentially entails. The nurturing of certain spaces has been critical to the facilitation of shared discussion and understanding between stakeholders about key aspects of the programme.

## **Implementation**

- There was a broad consensus from inside and outside UN that the coordination mechanisms among the participating agencies and their partners were excellent. Actually the strong ability to coordinate and bring together the contrasting parties and stakeholders in such a fragmented society was frequently mentioned as one of the most notable achievement of the programme.
- We determined two key factors that appeared to be sustaining this successful coordination. The first key factor is the personal commitment of the programme officers at the technical level and the second key factor, the institutional support from the senior management both within the UN agencies and in the government. These two essential aspects enabled the programme to conveniently resolve issues relating to various components, from simple operational hiccups to disparate views of the programme. Having these two factors in place is especially important in a programme such as this which covers new working grounds in terms of the theme and the format of the programme.
- This JP is unanimously regarded by the three participating agencies as the first successful attempt to really work together and therefore offers the platform to enlarge and expand future initiatives for cooperation. There are a number of tangible examples that show a genuine level of honest collaboration.
- One area where most informants agreed the coordination could improve was with the private sector. The management of the programme is fully aware of this shortcoming and

steps are already being taken to promote Public-Private Partnership (PPP) within the programme.

- It was often apparent that people involved in implementing one particular product would not be aware of the other products, activities or components of the programme which limited the progression of synergies amongst different stakeholders (implementers and contractors). This detachment was particularly apparent in the educational component that appeared somehow isolated from the rest of the programme.
- Outcome 1 has advanced the most in terms of the pace of delivering the products. This component is progressing at an advanced pace. The only element that could be sped up in order to achieve the desired results is the construction of the web portal.
- It may result that after implementing all the activities planned under outcome 2 the level of cross-cultural understanding does not show a noticeable improvement at the local level in BiH. This should not be considered as a fault of the programme but rather as an indicator that shows just the enormity of the task of changing beliefs and behaviours in a post-conflict environment. However, the activities planned are being implemented at a good pace.
- Outcome 3 also has a fine pace of delivery. It has been planned for many of the products to be delivered in the second half of the programme and there is certainly no cause for concern in terms of the programme's capacity to deliver them. The products will improve competitiveness within the cultural industries sector in the selected municipalities in BiH which has the potential to enhance income-generation and employment opportunities.
- Outcome 4 would be the main focus of the second part of the implementation within the programme. Therefore at the time of the evaluation this outcome inevitably showed a lower delivery pace. However, a number of activities have begun. The delivery pace for this outcome is expected to increase considerably during the second half of the JP.
- The delivery rate in the middle of the project is reported at exactly 50%. The delivery rate has slightly slower during 2009, most significantly in the case of UNDP, although never alarmingly low.

## Results

- Vertical logic can be defined as the "dotted line" that connects the activities with the outcomes, the purpose and the goals of a programme. It is the "line" that keeps a given programme "results oriented". In the case of 'Improving Cultural Understanding in Bosnia Herzegovina', we found the vertical logic to be very good.
- In general the programme is very results orientated. However, in occasions, the programme favoured processes over results. Processes are indeed of key importance in complex programmes such as this one. Nonetheless, in the instances where processes are favoured over results, the programme needs to keep on being very aware of this and to always have valid reasons for this preference.
- Outcome 1 aims to strengthen government's capacities for planning and policy making in the fields of culture and intercultural education. This is the component of the programme where better results have been discovered. Especially, there have been a number of

successful strategies and activities geared to enhance coordination between the different levels of government in BiH.

- There is a great level of ownership by the national governmental partners that resulted in a smooth cooperation which is probably one of the most outstanding results. This ownership by the government was not only acknowledged by the governmental partners themselves but also by stakeholders from Civil Society and the Private Sector.
- The programme is also producing concrete results in terms of helping the country to align with EU processes and requirements in terms of culture. Most informants and an overwhelming 88.4% of the respondents of the online survey thought that the programme is contributing to progress towards EU integration.
- Outcome 2 appears to have a weak articulation of the educational component with the overall initiative. Yet, this component has produced some very interesting results that should be carefully analysed and fostered.
- There was a broad consensus that if one wants to tackle intercultural understanding; schools are of upmost importance by providing their role in forming values and attitudes. Under this outcome 23 schools were provided with training on intercultural understanding and with a national exchange programme for students. However, the selection process may have undermined significantly the level of ownership over the initiative.
- The strengthening of cultural industries in outcome 3 came up almost as a separate specific objective of the programme rather than as a mere component. Most stakeholders fully understood its relevance for livelihoods and as a source of revenue, and the potential for economic development in BiH.
- At the local level, the strengthening of the cultural industries linking cultural production, cultural tourism and cultural heritage was very present in several of the municipalities visited during this evaluation. In some cases the vertical logic was very well articulated. In other cases, the local activities seemed to be mainly stimulating cultural production but lacking a clear link with a potential source of revenue and therefore with economic development.
- At the entity and state level, there was a wide acknowledgment that developing the cultural sector would not only serve as a source of income but could also reduce intercultural tensions.
- Outcome 4, "Improved tolerance towards diversity", mainly tries to be achieved through developing a social campaign through media. Through the engagement of media and journalists in the dissemination and promotion of positive messages about the richness and added value of a diverse "Bosnia and Herzegovina" culture, it is hoped that there will be an increased general awareness of the value of culture and diversity. In this regard, at the equator of the programme, some decisive steps have been taken. However, this outcome seemed to be the least advanced due to its complexity and to an intentional implementation strategy.
- The programme carries very realistic expectations for what can be achieved in such a limited period of time in terms of intercultural integration. Despite obvious difficulties,

positive steps have been taken on the road to improving intercultural dynamics and there are solid examples to show this.

## **Monitoring and Evaluation**

- The stakeholders place great importance in the M&E activities undertaken by the programme. Although most informants shared that enthusiasm for the M&E activities, however, a few key stakeholders perceived M&E as another layer of management rather than its real function of being an empowering tool to enhance the achievements of the programme.
- A great job was done at the designing stage to make sure that the implementation phases would follow the vertical logic, creating excellent tools like the M&E framework and the identification of targets. However, we could establish that during the implementation phase there are not enough spaces where the management and the other stakeholders reflect on the vertical logic and the quality of the products.

## **Sustainability**

- There is a good level of co-financing by governmental institutions both at the state/entity level and at the local level. The level of national ownership is very high and most managerial decisions are shared by the government and the UN partners. The programme has also advanced in enhancing the technical capabilities of those institutions in charge of cultural and educational development in BiH. However, the coordination and the administration of funds are largely driven from UN agencies within UN premises.
- It is unlikely that before the programme ends we can see a full transfer to the government. However, although the long term horizon should always be transferring to the government, the UN team is well placed (with additions of other UN or external experts) to create a good platform with the government and with the municipalities to carry the programme to a next phase.
- Most stakeholders interviewed see two main pockets of funds that could continue the work paved by the present programme; IPA funds and the development of strong partnerships with the private sector.
- Outcome 1 has a huge potential to ensure that the results already achieved from the programme continue after the assistance has come to an end. This component has considerably developed already the capacity and the ownership of key national stakeholders.
- It is not easy to predict whether and how the achievements on improving cross-cultural understanding at the local level will be sustained after the programme comes to an end. The capacity development of key local champions may benefit greatly the sustainability of this outcome. Also KAP has the potential to become a reference tool in the country for measuring the changes in terms of cross-cultural understanding.

- The sustainability of the achievements under outcome 3 would greatly depend on the suitable and relevant organizational arrangements that the programme manage to make with the private sector.
- Outcome 4 is mainly due for implementation during the second part of the programme. It is therefore somewhat premature to make an assessment about the sustainability of their elements. Nonetheless, the reconstruction of the three religious monuments and their potential use as symbols of tolerance and cultural understanding has a big potential to be maintained and progress after the end of the programme.

### **Emerging issues**

- They have integrated gender in most of their strategy papers and action plans. However, it seems that those efforts did not permeate through to the actual activities and stakeholders of the programme.
- Like gender, ICT was an issue that rarely emerged during the evaluation regardless of the fact that the programme has reported to have made considerable efforts putting in place ICT tools to enhance the outreach.
- During the course of this evaluation UNESCO was mentioned by several key informants as the UN Agency better positioned to provide a substantive lead to the programme in the future as it is now developing internationally specific platforms beyond Cultural Heritage on Culture for Development.
- An overwhelming majority of the informants mentioned spontaneously the Spanish MDG Fund as the financier of this programme. This was specified both at the state/entity level and at the local level.
- Throughout this evaluation, external and internal informants have praised the quality of UN staff on numerous occasions. The programme would not have got to the point where it is now if it were not for the professional caliber of their staff.



# Mid-term evaluation of “Improving cultural understanding in BiH”

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**Eva Otero**

August 2010

# Mid-term evaluation of the UN Joint Programme “Improving cultural understanding in BiH”

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This report has been produced by independent evaluators, commissioned by the MDG-F Secretariat. As such, the views put forward in this report should not be considered as those of the MDG-F. The views expressed in this report reflect those of numerous informants, sources and research conducted by the evaluation team. Any comments regarding this report can be forwarded to the evaluation team by email or telephone at:

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## Acronyms and Terms

Acronym	Term
BER	Basic Efficiency Resource
BiH	Bosnia Herzegovina
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
EU	European Union
FBiH	Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina
JP	Joint Programme
IPA	Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MDG-F	Millennium Development Goal Fund
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NSC	National Steering Committee
PMC	Programme Management Committee
PPP	Public-Private Partnership
ToR	Terms of Reference
UN	United Nations
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistant Framework
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WG	Working Group

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## **Introduction**

The task of an evaluator is never a simple one. After just several weeks of interaction within a programme, one cannot appreciate its depth and complexities in the same respect as those who work in the programme day in and day out. The evaluation seeks to determine what have been the outputs up until now and how these outputs relate to the goals of the programme. Although, it is more than likely that the implementing partners will already have a great knowledge in terms of what the outcomes of the programme have been so far and the impacts of implemented activities. Much of what has been produced in this report will not be new to the management. So, what is left for the evaluator to offer is an outside perspective. By talking to other stakeholders, the evaluator can also offer feedback that others have not been able to provide directly. What we as evaluators anticipate, however, is that by putting in writing and stating what you as managers already know, will make a cause for celebration and also for change where needed.

## **Premises, Context, objectives and methodology**

### **Objective of the evaluation**

As stated in the ToRs, this mid-term evaluation aims to improve the implementation of the Joint Programme (JP), “Improving Cultural Understanding in BiH” for the second phase of implementation from July 2010 to December 2011. This is a rapid assessment evaluation that seeks to identify the best practices and lessons learned from the programme as well as generate knowledge that could be adapted suitably and applied to other programmes. The conclusions and recommendations put forward in this evaluation will be passed on to the main users: the Programme Management Committee (PMC), the National Steering Committee (NSC) and the Secretariat of the Fund.

### **Methodology applied**

This evaluation has followed a six-step process: (1) engaging stakeholders and conducting a brief needs assessment; (2) describing the programme and validating the evaluation framework with the main users; (3) refining the evaluation framework and designing data collection tools; (4) gathering credible evidence; (5) consolidating data and writing the report; (6) sharing the draft report with the main users for feedback then finalization.

The first step we took was to understand how the evaluation might be utilised and what the main users need to learn from the final report. At the same time, we constructed a preliminary description of the Joint Programme – the need, the purpose, the components and the logic model to validate it with the main users. After better understanding the needs and the scope of the programme and of the evaluation, we refined a mixed methods evaluation approach.

In order to answer the evaluation questions, we consulted the best available evidence across a range of sources. This final report presents key findings and on the basis of the gathered evidence, responds to those evaluation questions.

During the evaluation, the following research tools and data sources were used:

#### **Preliminary needs assessment with management and staff**

Critical to the evaluation process was to ensure that the final report would be relevant to the end users. It was important to start with an accurate description of the programme's purpose and modus operandi. Telephone consultations with four key staff helped to shape the evaluation design.

The original ToRs were combined with several questions raised during the needs assessment, prioritized according to need and organized within the evaluation's logic model framework. Other questions were kept in mind as issues to be explored, but not systematically examined.

#### **Desk review**

The MDG-F Secretariat and the BiH country office provided numerous documents, including strategy documents, reports, media briefings and research publications. We also reviewed a number of third party reports and official documents. For a full list of all documents reviewed please refer to Annex 1.

#### **Stakeholder map**

We used a stakeholder map to identify and classify the partners and staff members involved with the Programme. Partners and staff were classified according to the type of organisation they belong to (UN System; Other International agency; INGO; National NGO; Media; Local Government; State Government; Entity Government; Private Sector) and their relationship with the Programme (Management; Direct partner; Indirect Partner; Bird Eye viewer). The map served two purposes: it provided a snapshot of the range of partners; and was used to select potential interview and survey respondents.

#### **In-depth informant interviews and workshops**

The evaluation team conducted semi-structured interviews, either one to one or in small groups with 36 key informants whose selection was based on the stakeholder map. Efforts were made to ensure that a range of voices were represented and included. For each of the potential interview groups, questions were drawn up that addressed some of the core evaluation questions and also intersected with their background. Although the interview sheets were highly structured, we freely followed-up on any emerging issues that appeared relevant to the core questions.

#### **Debriefings**


The evaluation team conducted a debriefing workshop with the evaluation reference group of the programme to present the preliminary findings at the end of the field mission. They also had a debriefing session with the Secretariat of the MDG-F. These debriefings gave stakeholders the opportunity to complete and challenge the initial conclusions and to provide the evaluation team with extra documentation to conclude the data analysis.

### Online survey

To ensure that a wide spectrum of views was represented, and to collect more quantitative responses, a web survey was conducted, covering impressions of all the identified partners and staff in the stakeholders map. The questionnaire was provided in 2 languages – English and local language- and it was received by 72 stakeholders. Of these, 32 returned either a completed or partially completed questionnaire, representing a response rate of 44%. This high ratio of responses already indicates a high engagement of the partners of the programme, especially government.

As indicated in figure 1, 61% of the respondents came from governmental institutions, of which 32% came from local governments and 29% from State/Entity governments. There was an equal number of responses from the government of RS, the government of FBiH and the state government.

Figure 1



### Basic Efficiency Resource (BER) analysis<sup>1</sup>

We conducted a Basic Efficiency Resource (BER) to provide a perspective on those products or activities which were perceived as most or least effective. This was based on their resources invested, in terms of their contributions to the outcomes of the different components. The list assessed was based on the account of activities reported by the Programme, and assessments were made by survey respondents.

### Limitations of the evaluation

Most interviews were conducted in local language and assisted by a translator. This introduces a non measurable degree of deviation that should be taken into account when considering findings.

Common time and resource constraints for conducting rapid assessments evaluations limit the ability to capture all relevant information. This is particularly notable when we face highly complex interventions that take place in extremely complex environments.

<sup>1</sup> Model developed by Eva Otero & Dr. Brian Cugelman, 2009



# Description of the development intervention

## The need

Culture in BiH represents a major challenge for development. Yet with some progressive steps forward, cultural development in BiH shows enormous potential to resolve many key issues that have arisen in the country due to its complex history, various cultural identities and cultural heritages which, in light of recent history of the country have come into conflict. This potential, together with the idea that cultural development can result in great political and socio-economic development is a key principle of the JP. A focus on the benefits of the country's intercultural dynamics has the potential to promote wider tolerance, acceptance and understanding, and to provide economic opportunities that in themselves deliver development. Therefore, strengthening cross-cultural understanding, the role of culture and related cultural tourism in development strategies and planning, and building the understanding and capacity to deliver these, will enhance the prospects of meeting key Millennium Development Goal (MDG) indicators.

## The purpose

The joint programme aims at strengthening cross-cultural understanding by: (i) improving the cultural policy and legal framework, (ii) improving cross-cultural understanding, (iii) strengthening the cultural industries, and (iv) improving tolerance towards diversity.

The main goal is aligned with two outcomes from UNDAF: "Strengthened accountability and responsiveness of governments to pro-active citizens" and "Improved access to and quality of education, health and social protection services". It is also linked to the MDGs, particularly "Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger" (MDG 1) and "Develop a Global Partnership for Development" (MDG 8).

## Components

### Outcome 1: Developed and implemented cultural policies and legal frameworks

Outcome 1 aims to strengthen government's capacities for planning and policy making in the fields of culture and intercultural education. All activities are geared to enhance coordination between the different levels of government in BiH; to better align with EU processes and requirements and to improve BiH's implementation of international conventions related to culture and/or education by improving or adopting new legal frameworks.

### Outcome 2: Improved cross-cultural understanding at the community level

This Outcome aims to strengthen management skills at the local level, and to influence the process of policy development at the state level. Schools are particularly strategic given the important role educational content and in-school interactions play in forming values, attitudes, and patterns of behaviour.

### Outcome 3: Strengthened cultural industries


Cultural industries are important for livelihoods and as a source of revenue, and have potential for further economic development in BiH. The strengthening of the cultural industries through interlinking cultural production, cultural tourism and cultural heritage, can reduce intercultural

tensions and enhance local economic development. At the same time, strong emphasis is being put on fusing the traditional with the modern. This will allow the development of a cultural industries market that can meet the demands of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Outcome 4: Improved tolerance towards diversity

This Outcome aims to develop a behaviour change communications campaign that promotes the social cohesion, tolerance, and understanding through addressing stereotyping in the media. This will be undertaken through the media, film, cultural opinion leaders, children, parents, educators, and other stakeholder groups. In this respect, the programme also works on the restoration and rehabilitation of important shared heritage as symbols for representing BiH's rich intercultural traditions and identity.

## Detailed description of the Theory of Change of the programme



## Level of analysis: Evaluation Criteria and Evaluation Questions

The object of analysis of this evaluation is the Joint Programme within three frameworks a) the cultural and political context of BiH with particular regards to the country's efforts to meet the requirements for accession to the EU; b) the MDGs and the general aims of the thematic window for "culture and development" and c) the undergoing reform within the UN System.

As a result of the documents reviewed and the brief needs assessment conducted at the beginning of the evaluation process, an evaluation framework was drafted. The evaluation framework had four levels of analysis; *Design* and alignment with national priorities, MDGs and EU accession process; *Implementation*, including coordination mechanism and pace of delivery; *Results* by component and *Sustainability*, including M&E mechanisms. The original questions prompted in the ToRs were combined with several issues raised during the brief needs assessment and were organized within the four levels of analysis.

## Findings, remarks and lessons learnt

### Design

Under this unit of analysis we examine the process that took place from the conceptualization of the programme by the three participating agencies (UNDP, UNESCO and UNICEF) to the moment implementation of activities began. This includes the inception phase during which the management of the programme thoroughly analyzed each of the components of the results framework as well as the monitoring framework and the annual work plans that included annual targets. We especially focused (following the evaluation questions agreed in the inception report) on whether the design of the programme responded to national/local priorities and if the aims and key assumptions of the programme were clear to key stakeholders.

The entire formulation process should be highly remarked. The programme was designed around the areas of expertise provided by the implementing UN agencies and enriched by the participatory contribution of the government partners – 78% of the government partners who responded to the on-line survey thought that *"Myself (and/or my organization) contributed to raising the quality of the design of the programme"*. This reflects our findings from the in-depth interviews with government officials.

Within a complex political and institutional architecture of the country, this process was an instrumental key to ownership and strong engagement of national and local governments. A good example of this strong engagement from the beginning can be noted in the final document presented by UN for approval to the pertinent authorities that was signed and returned without further comments.

Some international experts were also hired during the design phase to provide specific expertise in the area of culture for development. However, in this latter case no relevant contribution to quality of design has been reported.


From the conceptualization of the programme, UNICEF, UNESCO and UNDP decided to jointly work on the idea whereby cultural heritage development in BiH could become a catalyst for better intercultural understanding among local communities and for strengthening cultural industries and the cultural sector in general. The concept was very much formulated and developed around the own expertise and philosophies

of the agencies with the strong engagement of the governmental partners. This tight collaboration from the design stage set the tone for a very strong teamwork during the implementation phase as we will see below.

### **Programme alignment to national/local priorities**

The programme was overwhelmingly perceived by the government as being aligned with the political priorities of BiH both at the local and at the state/entity level and the objectives and indicators were fully understood. This consensus was supported further in the on-line survey as figure 2 shows.

*Figure 2: Responses from government partners*



From another perspective, at a local level the 10 core municipalities participating in the programme used the opportunity at their disposal to identify and design local projects which kept with their own local priorities within the cultural sector. Therefore as a result, all interviewees agreed that the programme was in accordance with the priorities of the country and community.

In general terms, the national ownership is excellent. However, for the educational component of the programme, according to a number of relevant interviewees, there is still room for progress despite the good efforts that has already been made. From the inception phase in the fall 2008, UNICEF gave presentations about the JP to the highest education authorities in the country including two to the Standing Conference of Education Ministers. Also, the process of selecting the members of the education WG was geared to promote ownership amongst the most relevant authorities. UNICEF asked them to appoint the members of the group. The actual work of this WG, composed by relevant authorities, again promoted national ownership.

Furthermore, the National Educational Strategy for Education<sup>2</sup> states a number of objectives that are clearly aligned with the intercultural understanding goals of this programme about tackling prejudices and stereotypes.

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<sup>2</sup> "Institutional and Capacity Building of Bosnia and Herzegovina Education System, Educational Strategy, 2008.

Finally, the programme was perceived by all national partners as “first of a kind”. It was appreciated as the first time international development had primarily focused on cultural development beyond cultural heritage. This was particularly well received by the cultural authorities of the country who are taking the opportunity to showcase how “culture” could be a source for “investment” rather than “expenditure”.


#### Links with MDGs and the EU integration process

Particular comments were made concerning how instrumental the programme would be regarding the process of BiH’s integration into the EU which is one of the country’s top priorities. There was indeed a broad consensus among the interviewees and as figure 3 reinstates, the programme is strongly perceived as being linked and contributing to this EU accession process.

It is less obvious the link of the objectives of the programme with the MDGs. During interviews the issue was raised and most informants were capable to trace some kind of relationship between the programme and the MDGs. Also, when reviewing the programme literature especially that produced during the design stage the outcomes of the JP are fully included into UNDAF 2010-2015 and MDGs were linked to both activities and outputs.

In addition, as figure 3 shows, over 80% of the survey respondents believe that the project is aligned or linked to the MDGs. We can therefore conclude that there is a connection between the programme and the MDGs, although in qualitative terms this link cannot be so clearly distinguished.

Figure 3



#### Level of clarity of objectives among key stakeholders

During the field mission we could established that the objectives of the programme appeared to be clear to most stakeholders. This was further emphasised by an 84% of the survey respondents agreeing with the statement “The objectives of the programme are clear to me”.

There was however a small but important subtlety in this regard. Most informants identified as the key objective of the programme either “improving intercultural understanding” as improving the country’s intercultural dynamics or “developing cultural industries”. Rarely an informant would state that the project was actually about both and only occasionally they saw the connection between them. It is as if the programme was perceived to have two separate specific objectives. To certain extent this can be a common feature that not all partners or stakeholders at all levels are to be necessarily aware with all aspects of the

JP.

#### **Others issues on design**

a) There could have been gaps in the design of the programme due to the long timeframe between conceptualization and implementation; more than one and a half years. However, we could conclude that the outcomes have managed to stay truth to the original aims as expressed in the concept note.

b) The programme has been able to adapt creatively to the implementation needs. A good example was the selection process of the 10 municipalities that was not proposed in the original programme document.

During this first one and a half years, the objective of “developing cultural industries” received a stronger focus, especially within those components that operated at a local level. This appears to be related to a certain extent with an intentional implementation strategy. In accordance with the programme management, the components related to improving the intercultural dynamics were to be the focus during the second phase of the programme when the way was paved among partners and stakeholders. This will be further discussed in the later chapter, “implementation”.

#### **Understanding of key concepts such as "culture"**

The evaluation showed that there is an adequate understanding among stakeholders about what “culture for development” means and about what the concept potentially entails, not only as a tool to develop the country socially and economically but also, although to a lower degree, as a catalyst for better intercultural understanding and therefore political, economical and social stability. Only sometimes, informants would describe the concept of inclusion and interculturalism focusing exclusively on reaching marginal communities such as Roma and people with special needs. This occurred particularly at the local level.

The nurturing of certain spaces has been critical to the facilitation of shared discussion and understanding between stakeholders about key aspects of the programme. The PMC has proven to serve as one of these essential spaces. The working groups were also dynamic spaces where different stakeholders could discuss important concepts related to the programme. In some cases, the progression of these discussions can be considered an impressive result on its own. This is the case for instance of the WG on education, a space highly regarded by their members both as a productive site to advance a common vision of intercultural education and to develop a potential informal network of education practitioners.

## Implementation

In this chapter we tackle two main aspects, “coordination” and “pace”. Under “coordination” we answer evaluation questions to do with the extent and the efficiency with which participating UN agencies are coordinating with each other and with their partners, like the government and the civil society, including the private sector. We also deal with how different components of the programme interrelate. Under “pace”, we look at the delivery rate of the different implementing partners and the pace at which the different components are generating products.

### **Coordination among participating agencies and the rest of stakeholders**

There was a broad consensus among all informants from inside and outside UN that the coordination mechanisms among the participating agencies and their partners were excellent, as illustrated by figure 4.

Among the number of reasons given by stakeholders, the one most frequently mentioned was the impeccable coordination exercised by the Programme Manager. As any other team, the promoters and implementers of this programme had gone through different phases – i.e. “forming” “storming” and “performing”. At the “equator” of the programme the team is clearly “performing”. The Programme Manager was unanimously identified as the key person who managed to deal constructively with natural initial contrasting views in order for the team and all the key stakeholders to progress to the next level. As a consequence, the Programme Manager has become an important asset to ensuring the well functioning of the programme.

One of the aspects that are functioning particularly well according to all stakeholders is the coordination among the UN agencies. Nearly 80% of all survey respondents thought that the involved UN agencies are coordinating among them efficiently. Most significantly 100% of all UN respondents thought so.

This JP is unanimously regarded by the three participating agencies as the first successful attempt to really work together and therefore offers the platform to enlarge and expand future initiatives for cooperation. There are a number of tangible examples that show a genuine level of honest collaboration, such as the use of a joint common logo – the MDG-F image – which represents the JP, as opposed to the use of each individual agency’s logos. The programme’s common premises also offers the right setting to increase collaboration amongst agencies and also allows for the active presence of the three principle agencies in management committees, for instance within the PMC and within all the relevant WGs.

We determined two key factors that appeared to be sustaining this successful coordination. The first key factor is the personal commitment of the programme officers at the technical level and the second key factor, the institutional support from the senior management both within the UN agencies and in the government. These two essential aspects enabled the programme to conveniently resolve issues relating to various components, from simple operational hiccups to disparate views of the programme. Having these two factors in place is especially important in a programme such as this which covers new working grounds in terms of the theme and the format of the programme.


An important underlying coordination mechanism that is working successfully are the five WGs established by the programme. These WGs have provided concrete outputs for the programme and most significantly, they have helped to intensify communication within the cultural sector in BiH, especially among relevant governmental bodies. The WGs have provided as many as 66 different events where diverse members of the



groups have united in order to reflect and decide on concrete issues related to the programme. Both UN agencies and the government valued very positively these mechanisms that have helped to fortify coordination and communication among all the partners. On the other hand, informal spaces such as study tours have also contributed to increase collaboration between key actors within the cultural sector in BiH.

In conclusion, coordination with the government and with civil society is considered to be very adequate. Actually the strong ability to coordinate and bring together the contrasting parties and stakeholders in such a fragmented society was frequently mentioned as one of the most notable achievements of the programme.

Figure 4



However, one area where most informants agreed the coordination could improve was with the private sector. This was further echoed in the survey where a significant 25% was not sure whether the coordination with the private sector has been efficient.

This can be partially explained by the intrinsic limitations that the UN system has in terms of creating working relationships with the Private Sector. UN regulations may cause a degree of difficulty with respect to transferring the ownership of products produced under a given programme to the private sector. Another restraining factor identified by informants was the law of BiH which does not distinguish between social businesses or cause-driven business and regular pure profitable ones.

However if a “can-be-done” attitude is adopted by all and positive and open support is provided by senior management and by programme officers, the programme will have the capability to produce creative solutions. Actually, the management of the programme is fully aware of this shortcoming and steps are already being taken to promote Public-Private Partnership (PPP). For instance, a comprehensive study on the subject has been commissioned and the recommendations are carefully being looked at.

#### **Interrelation of the different components of the programme**

As mentioned above, the majority of the stakeholders had grasped a good understanding of the overall goals of the programme. However, it was often apparent that people involved in implementing one particular product would not be aware of the other products, activities or components of the programme which limited the progression of synergies amongst different stakeholders (including “implementers” and

“contractors”). In the case of the “contractors” a reason for this could be that providing them with privilege internal information may result in comparative advantages which infringe the UN regulations on ensuring transparency and fairness.

This detachment was particularly apparent in the educational component that appeared somehow isolated from the rest of the programme. The intricate articulation of educational authorities in BiH made it difficult to find a single governmental partner to deal with. With the guidance of UNICEF, an educational WG was set up within the programme, as previously mentioned, which resulted to be exceptionally participatory and highly valued by their members. The group was composed of 28 various representatives from a range of relevant education authorities in the country. However, this group did not have a specific representation at the management level of the programme, i.e. the PMC. Therefore, despite the good coordination efforts by MoCA, there is still room for improvement in the flow of information between the different components of the programme and the education WG.

A possible reason could be that although education and culture does not always fall under the same ministry (this is the case of FBiH). Even in the RS and at the state level where both components come under the same authorities, culture and education carry very distinct portfolios. MoCA took the responsibility of communication and coordination of the education component as well as the cultural one at the PMC level. However, the PMC is heavily inclined towards the cultural aspect and indeed, even if we recognise that culture is the principle focus of this programme, there is a tendency of underrepresentation of the educational component which could have adverse effects on national ownership gained within the WG.

We also found certain disconnection among some products or activities within the component itself. For instance, the education WG was not involved within the selection process of the municipalities in which schools ended up receiving intercultural trainings. Nor was there any contact with the principals of these schools despite the fact that the key task of the group was to precisely analyze the curricula and practices within schools in terms of intercultural education. They actually produced a report with a specific recommendation referring to intercultural training and who should select the schools (*see text box on this page*). Also, the fact that the members of the group found out about the trainings not from the programme but from other sources may have dented their sense of purpose.

It is envisaged for 2010-11 that the WG gets involved in the training of the professors in the primary schools of the 10 core

*“It is suggested that these schools be nominated by the members of the working group that participated in development of this report. In this way a wholly BiH based programme of teacher development will be created leading to those directly involved in pilot schools, not only to awareness and understanding of intercultural teaching and learning, but also competence in intercultural teaching and learning based on school based developments and carefully considered and evaluated practices. In this way, the pilot schools programme of development will provide for BiH locally created self-sustaining practices and a locally owned developmental impetus for all schools to further improve their practices over the next decade”. (Report on curricula and school practices in BiH from the perspective of intercultural education)<sup>1</sup>*

municipalities. However, it would be appropriate for the programme to do some “damage control” to assess if the previous miscommunications<sup>3</sup> affect the future commitment of the members of the group.

### **The pace of implementation**

#### Improved policies & legal frameworks in culture and education sectors

Substantively, Outcome 1 has advanced the most in terms of the pace of delivering the products. At the midpoint of the programme, comprehensive cultural statistics have been gathered which are already enabling cultural analysis and planning and also have the potential to further impact upon policies and frameworks in culture and education.

Steps have been taken and are in place to create a multifunctional BiH culture web framework. Although the initial target of introducing this framework by mid 2010 (as proposed by the M&E framework) has not been attained, the JP has set up a functional working group that has dealt with and overcome several initial hiccups regarding technical issues and the bases of the culture web framework and its contents have been agreed.

Great progress has been made in terms of strengthening the capacities of the institutions within the culture sector. A participatory Action Plan has been drafted which demonstrates excellent potential as mentioned under “results” and there has been a great effort to incorporate within the plan transversal issues such as gender. Also, amongst other activities, three study tours took place in London, Hungary and Spain.

Important steps have been made at a suitable pace regarding the improvement of cultural protection and particularly in adhering to UNESCO conventions.

Finally, M&E trainings have been designed and are being conducted in order to strengthen the M&E capacity of culture institutions. At the mid-term point, the pace of delivery of the cultural sector in this component is very satisfactory.

With regard to the education sector, the pace of delivery is also very satisfactory. A participatory report on curricula and school environments has been conducted and it is expected that for the second part of the programme the JP will assist with the implementation of the recommendations given in this report. Also, some training for interculturalism and exchanges has been carried out for teachers, schools and pupils. Although the pace is very good here, a better articulation of the components would benefit the progress and achievement of the result “Improved policies and legal frameworks in education sector to ensure access to quality multi-cultural education”, as we have already mentioned under coordination among components.

From an overall assessment we can conclude that this component is progressing at an advanced pace. The only element that could be sped up in order to achieve the desired results is the construction of the web portal.

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<sup>3</sup> By miscommunications we refer to the fact that members of the group were not aware of the intercultural training that CIVITAS was providing and nor did they deem it to be part of their mandate.

### Improved cross-cultural understanding at the community level

As explained under results, the improvement of cross-cultural understanding is not an easy task in BiH. It may result that after implementing all the activities planned under this component the level of cross-cultural understanding does not show a noticeable improvement at the local level in BiH. This should not be considered as a fault of the programme but rather as an indicator that shows just the enormity of the task of changing beliefs and behaviours in a post-conflict environment. However, the activities planned are being implemented at a good pace. Educational models have been developed by the education WG that promote social inclusion and a number of projects to tackle interculturalism are taking place in the 10 core municipalities. Also a study on behavioral attitudes concerning interculturalism (KAP) was being finalized during the course of this evaluation. The study which is to be repeated at the end of 2011 will track progress on this sensitive issue for BiH.

There is also a steady pace on the delivery of activities geared towards reinforcing stakeholder capacities in the field of cultural development and the promotion of interculturalism, especially amongst CSOs and local NGOs in the core municipalities.

### Strengthened cultural industries

A list of intangible cultural heritages and an inventory of cultural products has been developed. In the 10 core municipalities the majority of the projects aim to strengthen the cultural industries and most of them are at an adequate level of implementation.

Also a number of cultural tourism projects were selected and funded at the local level. During the course of the evaluation guide books were being finalized to promote sustainable tourism that linked with cultural heritage in BiH. This component has a fine pace of delivery. It has been planned for many of the products to be delivered in the second half of the programme and there is certainly no cause for concern in terms of the programme's capacity to deliver them. The products will improve competitiveness within the cultural industries sector in the selected municipalities in BiH which has the potential to enhance income-generation and employment opportunities.

Here it is worth noting that the development of the web portal could really enhance the promotion of the cultural industry and tourism, which again is another reason for the need to increase its pace.

### Improved tolerance levels towards diversity

Likewise, outcome 2, improving tolerance level towards diversity is a complex task and even if all the activities are implemented the results may not appear to be extremely significant. Again, this should not be seen as a fault of the programme but rather demonstrate the magnitude of the task.

Following the in-depth interviews that were conducted with the implementing partners and the desk review, we could establish that this outcome would be the focus of the second part of the implementation within the programme. Therefore at the time of the evaluation this outcome inevitably showed a lower delivery pace. However, a number of activities have begun. For instance, the restoration of the religious symbols by UNESCO and the media analysis on cultural stereotyping; also a comprehensive communication strategy has been conducted. The activities are being implemented under a good pace. The delivery pace for this outcome is expected to increase considerably during the second half of the JP.

## The delivery rate

Figure 5

	Total Approved Joint Programme Budget	Total Amount Transferred in 2009	Total Budget Committed 2009	Total Budget Disbursed 2009	Delivery rate 2009
UNICEF	\$1.707.860,00	\$573.344,00	\$551.897,34	\$484.418,03	96%
UNESCO	\$1.790.290,00	\$610.374,00	\$459.578,00	\$358.615,00	75%
UNDP	\$4.501.850,00	\$1.316.610,00	\$952.268,39	\$798.293,18	72%
<b>TOTAL 2009</b>		<b>\$2.500.328,00</b>	<b>\$1.963.743,73</b>	<b>\$1.641.326,21</b>	<b>78%</b>
		Total Amount of Transferred until June 2010	Total Budget Committed until June 2010	Total Budget Disbursed until June 2010	Delivery rate up until June 2010
UNICEF		\$1.299.432,00	\$619.038,00	\$587.755,00	48%
UNESCO		\$1.487.874,00	\$701.523,00	\$521.125,00	47%
UNDP		\$3.349.774,00	\$1.718.535,00	\$1.289.355,00	51%
<b>TOTAL 2010</b>	<b>\$8.000.000,00</b>	<b>\$6.137.080,00</b>	<b>\$3.039.096,00</b>	<b>\$2.398.235,00</b>	<b>50%</b>

As we can see in figure 5 the financial implementing pace is perfectly on track. The delivery rate in the middle of the project is reported at exactly 50%. The delivery rate was slightly slower during 2009, most significantly in the case of UNDP, although never alarmingly low.

It is important to point out that in order to keep this delivery rate on track it is key to maintain the two factors mentioned above under the coordination chapter; commitment from the technical level and institutional support from senior officials. The lack of either of these two “ingredients” has the potential to damage the good rhythm of implementation of the programme.

Another factor that was identified as a potential difficulty for the future implementation was the elections scheduled for October 2010. The programme is fully anchored in the government’s mid-level management structures that shall remain stable regardless of the outcome of the elections. As such, the risks are brought to minimum. However, the highly political environment as well as pre-election focus of many political leaders could hinder some of the key aspects of the implementation.

## Results

In this proceeding chapter, we will review and analyse the main achievements of the programme. We will start with some general considerations about the vertical logic of the programme and then we will assess each of the four components of the programme identifying results, best practices and areas of concern. Following on from this, we will answer in greater detail some more specific questions posed in the ToRs and finish by discussing the results of concrete activities in relation with the investment through a Basic Efficiency Resource (BER).

### **The vertical logic of the programme: Processes and results.**

Vertical logic can be defined as the “dotted line” that connects the activities with the outcomes, the purpose and the goals of a programme. It is the “line” that keeps a given programme “results oriented”. In the case of ‘Improving Cultural Understanding in Bosnia Herzegovina’, we found the vertical logic to be very good. However, even if in general the programme is very results orientated, during the course of the evaluation, we established that on occasions, the programme favoured processes over results. For example, the 10 core municipalities selected for local activities may not have been the ones with the most potential in terms of clearly achieving the programme objectives. However, the selection processes itself produced extremely positive results which cannot be overlooked: cooperation and decision making between diverse stakeholders and ownership and engagement at the local level. It was also very important that the PMC had a sort of “social cohesion” criteria, making sure they will not only selected proposals on the basis of “results” but also on the basis of municipalities under-represented or under developed.

Another good example of processes vs. results is provided by the study tours. Several informants from different sectors, including government and UN raised the issue that study tours may be more efficient if they are organised for specialised audiences, like the study tour organised to London only for members of the education working group. Actually, in the BER analysis the study tour to London is the one that ranks highest in terms of impact, over the trip to Hungary and the trip to Spain. However, these two latter study tours that were organised for a more “generalist” audiences (mayors, educators, senior official of ministries, etc) were reported to have been key informal spaces for exchange and team building among the different components of the programme. In the case of the study tour to Spain, the program was jointly developed by all stakeholders. The issue of whether specialized study tours could be more beneficial than “generalist” study tours is actually a well rehearsed topic within the management of the JP and it is ultimately a subject related to results vs. processes.

Processes are indeed of key importance in complex programmes such as this one. However, in the instances where processes are favoured over results, the programme needs to keep on being very aware of this and to always have valid reasons for this preference.

### **Results in relation with the components of the project**

#### Outcome 1: Developed and implemented cultural policies and legal frameworks

Outcome 1 aims to strengthen government’s capacities for planning and policy making in the fields of culture and intercultural education. This is the component of the programme where better results have been traced. For instance, it should be mentioned that under the implementation period of this JP (2009) BiH

ratified all UNESCO legal instruments. Especially, there have been a number of successful strategies and activities geared to enhance coordination between all levels of government in BiH.

Most of the government informants stated that the programme has actually improved what they called the “vertical coordination”. The institutional architecture of the country is extremely complex and the articulation of competences are not always clear or balanced. The cultural and educational authorities in BiH are organised in many layers, some of them under-regulated. It is often the case that certain programmes are to be implemented by governmental levels that do not actually have the legal authority to carry them out which means that the progress of the programme becomes impeded. This is not the case in the present programme.


There was an overwhelming consensus that from the beginning, this programme involved many of the different parts of the government concerned, both in FBiH and in the Republika of Srpska. As a result, the governmental partners themselves could decide who would be most appropriate to get involved in the different working groups and other decision making spaces. This is resulting in a great level of ownership by the national governmental partners and a smooth cooperation which is probably one of the most outstanding results so far. This ownership by the government was not only acknowledged by the governmental partners themselves but also by stakeholders from Civil Society and the Private Sector who also believed that the government was regularly consulted and in command of the programme.

To demonstrate how successful the coordination has been so far between governmental entities, most partners consulted highlighted the drafting of the “Joint Action Plan for Implementation of BiH Cultural Policy Strategy” as a best practice. The Plan was drafted by the state government, the Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina and the Republic of Srpska in a working group set up by the programme.

This working group was not only helpful in improving the coordination with the cultural sector in BiH and producing concrete results like the Action Plan. The work of the WG was also reported by governmental sources as key input in the drafting of the RS cultural strategy approved at the end of 2009.

The programme is also producing concrete results in terms of helping the country to align with EU processes and requirements in terms of culture. Most informants and an overwhelming 88% of the respondents of the online survey (see figure 6) thought that the programme is contributing to progress towards EU integration.


Figure 6





### **SOKOLAC**

*Once training was received from UNESCO, the principal trainees from Sokolac proceeded to provide training in management of cultural projects for local CSOs and NGOs. These newly acquired skills from the training enabled the local organisations to fundraise 100,000km. The amount matched the budget of the local government of Sokolac for culture.*



The study tour to Hungary was also perceived to be very constructive as the national stakeholders on the tour were able to learn of the problems that Hungary are facing within the accession stage to the EU. They also became aware of the importance of culture and cultural heritage for the EU.

The programme is also enhancing capacities at the local level, a clear example was the call for proposals for municipalities that was perceived as an encouragement for applicants to become familiarised with new requirements and procedures normally used within EU standards.

Also, the trainings provided to the selected municipalities on management cultural projects were mentioned repeatedly and in occasions we could trace excellent results, as in the case of Sokolac.

### Outcome 2: Improved cross-cultural understanding at the community level

As previously mentioned, the articulation of the educational programme within the overall initiative could be improved. Yet, this component has produced some very interesting results that should be carefully analysed and fostered. Through this component, a working group for education was created and resulted to be an extraordinarily inclusive group. It consisted of members coming from all relevant educational authorities in BiH. With the guidance of the Institute for Education of London, the group produced a detailed report analysing the curricula of BiH to try to standardise intercultural understanding. A number of workshops and study tours were also carried out under this initiative.

For reasons mentioned above, the work of this working group was significantly unknown among the rest of the stakeholders and their work. The analysis of the BiH curricula is the only activity that has fallen into the quadrant “too expensive – not enough impact” in our BER analysis. Even though, as previously mentioned the study tour to London which is intimately related with this activity is very well rated.

Furthermore, throughout the evaluation, we could establish that the working group had become extremely engaged and enthusiastic about the whole process. We could also establish that there was a general willingness to take the process further than the production of the report and that they had the capacity to consolidate a national network of practitioners committed to the issues of cultural understanding and dialogue in the education sector. However, the group has not met since December 2009 and it lacks a



stronger leadership which could better articulate their future. UNICEF is well placed to take on that lead and bring the process forward and they are already doing so.

At the local level, the programme targeted 23 schools from the core municipalities that were selected (10 core municipalities and 13 short-listed localities). The 23 schools were provided with training on intercultural understanding and with a national exchange programme for students implemented by the INGO CIVITAS<sup>4</sup>. There was a broad consensus that if one wants to tackle intercultural understanding; schools are of utmost importance by providing their role in forming values and attitudes. Actually the activities conducted within the schools rated extraordinarily high in the “perceived impact” in the BER analysis, which shows that a high number of stakeholders perceived that activities with the schools are key to achieving the objectives of the programme.

The local schools were obliged to show the commitment to adhere to the programme’s educational activities by requesting a written approval from their respective ministry of education. However, they did not specifically ask for the trainings. This undermined significantly the level of ownership over the programme. Thus many of the trainings provided were received by people who were not necessarily interested. Despite this, when the trainings were received by true champions (as in the case of Novo Sarajevo), the benefits were valuable.

During the course of the evaluation we also collected some negative feedback about the quality of the intercultural trainings. However we could not establish whether this was honestly due to a lack of quality in the content and in the trainers or rather a general absence of interest on the part of the trainees, or additionally due to the general weakness of articulation within this component.

#### **NOVO SARAJEVO**

*The school exchanges, as proposed by UNICEF as a step towards intercultural integration within schools were perceived to be particularly successful in Novo Sarajevo. This achievement can be attributed to the exceptionally receptive principal of the school who recognised this educational component as a vital tool for the development and progress of intercultural education. This was further enhanced by the positive support from local families who allowed their children to participate in intercultural activities such as visiting other localities like Rudo and Mostar. There were school exchange programmes between the Republic of Sprska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is a positive example of good practice and clearly exemplifies the need for “champions” from the participating municipalities of this project in order for the outcomes to be fruitful.*

#### Outcome 3: Strengthened cultural industries

The strengthening of cultural industries came up almost as a separate specific objective of the programme rather than as a mere component. Most stakeholders fully understood its relevance for livelihoods and as a source of revenue, and the potential for economic development in BiH. The reason for this is mainly explained by the implementation design that firstly would focus on the strengthening of cultural industries.

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<sup>4</sup> Further trainings to all primary schools are planned for September 2010. The Education working group has been informed of these trainings.

#### **JAJCE**

*Jajce represents a worthy example of vertical logic and sustainable future planning. In Jajce it is anticipated that the reconstruction of the Temple of Mrta and of the Austro-Hungarian building that was historically a primary school will be positive steps towards attaining the UNESCO world heritage certificate which in turn will benefit the tourist industry. In addition, the foreseen sustainable tourist industry will serve to develop both cultural and socio-economic development in the municipality.*

At the local level, the strengthening of the cultural industries linking cultural production, cultural tourism and cultural heritage was very present in several of the municipalities visited during this evaluation. In some cases the vertical logic was very well articulated as in the case of Jajce.

In other cases, the local activities seemed to be mainly stimulating cultural production but lacking a clear link with a potential source of revenue and therefore with economic development. There were a couple of reasons we could find for this “de-link” between cultural production and economic development. During the course of the interviews several informants stated the lack of expertise at the local level in terms of developing imaginative and profitable cultural sectors. Another factor linked with the first one is that the private sector in the cultural area is still not well developed.

Indeed, the development of the private sector seems to be key for this outcome to produce good results. In this regard, as we mentioned under the coordination chapter, the intrinsic nature in which the UN relates with the private sector could be an obstacle.

At the entity and state level, there was a wide acknowledgment that developing the cultural sector would not only serve as a source of income but could also reduce intercultural tensions. As will be discussed under outcome 4, many informants actually considered intercultural diversity as a good “selling mark” for prospective tourism in BiH. Concrete activities such as the study tour to Spain were frequently mentioned as being an eye opener and an inspiration for development in the cultural sector. The participants of the study tour learnt how Spain receives a large proportion of its GDP from the cultural sector. We therefore found some evidence that the government at the entity and state level are assuming culture as an economic engine although there is still a long road ahead for articulating this on a practical level. The study tour to Spain is comfortably placed in the BER quadrant representing those activities with most perceived impact and with fewer resources invested.

Finally, the three religious symbols which are being reconstructed by UNESCO under the outcome four of this programme, presents a bigger potential to revitalise tourism around them by creating synergies with other activities and components of the programme such as educational activities or intercultural trainings. At present, many stakeholders appear to have little or no information on this element of the programme, despite the fact that is one of the activities that needs more investment. The management of the programme is aware of this and UNICEF and UNESCO are coordinating and developing relevant joint workshops to be developed around the restorations of these three important religious sites.

#### Outcome 4: Improved tolerance towards diversity

This outcome is mainly trying to be achieved through developing a social campaign through media. With the engagement of media and journalists in the dissemination and promotion of positive messages about the richness and added value of a cultural diversity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is hoped that there will be an

increased general awareness of the value of culture and diversity. In this regard, at the equator of the programme, some decisive steps have been taken as mentioned under implementation pace. Firstly, a comprehensive media analysis has been carried out on cultural stereotyping and a comprehensive media analysis has been produced. However, this outcome seemed to be the least advanced which could be put down to a number of reasons.

Firstly, the first half of the programme has essentially focused on outcome 1 and to a certain extent, 2 and 3 which is needed for setting the ground for the more complex outcome 4. Changing mind-frames is always a long-term difficult task. This is particularly true in BiH; a country full of cultural historical richness and constitutional complexity that commands a careful and sensitive approach to any type of analysis or implementation of new thought when it comes to deconstructing generalized stereotypes and improving the focus on greater communalities. Therefore, the programme carries very realistic expectations for what can be achieved in such a limited period of time in terms of intercultural integration. Despite these obvious difficulties, positive steps have been taken on the road to improving intercultural dynamics and there are solid examples to show this.

***Several decision-making and informative spaces created around concrete objectives of the programme served as a catalyst for intercultural dialogue***

As previously mentioned, the programme has created common spaces which seem to have been used as an appreciative tool for intercultural understanding. For instance, the PMC and the various working groups were perceived as some of these spaces where a variety of common processes were developed that have encouraged further collaboration and created contacts among members of different communities. For example, the selection process of the participating municipalities signified the cooperation of a variety of stakeholders for the selection to take place. Members of the state and entity level ministries took part in sharing field verification missions and together assessed the applications from municipalities that did not necessarily belong to their territorial boundaries. Also, other more informal spaces which were considered to be aiding intercultural dialogue and understanding were the study tours of other countries. Members of different working groups from different cultural backgrounds had the opportunity to exchange views and learn together.

The programme has also resulted in open spaces at a local level. Within the call for proposal, five open days were provided in which any municipality could attend, two in Banja Luka, two in Sarajevo and one in Mostar. These open spaces provided a space for the formation and improvement of inter-municipality relations from the FBiH and the Republic of Sprska alike. Also, after the selection process, trainings were provided for all participating municipalities and schools. These open spaces emerged as highly appreciated spaces and created appropriate environments to encourage intercultural dialogue and intercultural understanding.

In addition, the programme has already envisaged future processes for further integration in terms of deeper cooperation and joint partnership between municipalities of the Republic of Sprska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The programme's next call of proposal has developed a space for collaboration. Municipalities must form joint partnerships in order to proceed with the programme. Although, some informants argued that these collaborations may adopt a somewhat cosmetic form in the beginning, the fact that affiliations will have been made between municipalities is a very positive step.

### ***The programme has taken steps to tackle the underrepresentation of Herzegovina***

In terms of inclusion within the project, the programme has worked hard to omit inequalities by trying to firstly recognise the inequality and then attempting to resolve it. For example, Herzegovina was underrepresented in the selection of the core municipalities due to a lack of applications from the area, although, as some informants pointed out, it has possibly the biggest potential for cultural and touristic development. It was stated by some that a refocus on Herzegovina by the programme had already begun with activities in Trebinje and Mostar as well as public call for implementation of projects from civil society and private sector specifically for the Herzegovina area. These initiatives were valued very positively.

### ***Many stakeholders underlined the value of Bosnia and Herzegovina diversity as a unique tourist niche***

As emphasised by both local and national governmental stakeholders, Bosnia Herzegovina has the potential for creating a unique tourist niche based on its array of cultural diversity which could attract great waves of tourism. It is feasible that this programme may have contributed to a wider understanding of this fact and therefore may contribute towards the touristic potential of Bosnia Herzegovina.

Another important activity under this outcome is the restoration work in several religious and non-religious sites carried out by UNESCO. This activity is rated very high on efficiency under BER, therefore most people see the connection with the objective of the programme. We believe however that the value of it could be capitalised further. As mentioned before, its potential for cultural tourism is understated and also the potential to use them as tool in the intercultural training for schools, parents, educators and other stakeholders. For example, organising school trips to the monuments as part of the intercultural activities organised in the schools. Indeed, this outcome has an obvious connection with outcome 2 that needs to be developed further.

At the local level we found fewer examples of projects that were clearly tackling intercultural understanding and that somehow related to the promotion of the area for potential tourists in the future. However, Rudo was a positive example.

#### **RUDO**

*The municipality of Rudo created an intercultural youth camp. Relations have already been formed with many schools from various regions across BiH who will be sending children to this camp. Around 3000 youths will be attending the camp throughout the year. Intercultural integration in the region appears to have already commenced; from the cooperation of the local stakeholders working together to actualise the camp, to the formation of partnerships with sending schools from all parts of BiH. The case of Rudo demonstrates great vertical logic and this is further enhanced by the future plans of making this camp sustainable and also as a resource of attraction for visitors in the future.*

Efficiency Analysis (BER)


Figure 7 presents the Basic Efficiency Resource (BER) analysis, comparing the resourcing of activities to their perceived impact on the programme outcomes. It seeks to identify the most efficient activities, in terms of achieving the programme’s aims with the least resources.

The programme seeks to strike a balance between long-term planning and adapting to emerging opportunities and threats. Thus, it is in a constant state of flux, rendering it difficult to identify and assess the efficiency of their activities. To overcome this limitation, we identified key activities reported by the programme during our initial desk review that were later validated by the team programme in the early inception report. Then, we opened up the assessment of these activities to all survey respondents. To make the analysis sharper, those activities never mentioned in the field mission were dropped.

There is a lot of information contained in this chart. Instead of discussing it at length, we refer to it in the body of the report and leave readers to draw their own conclusions from it. We caution readers not to jump to conclusions about which approaches are better or worse. The BER analysis provides a good starting point for the programme to ask "why" activities may be clustered in their particular spot. For instance, in the case of the gender trainings, “why” despite the importance that the programme has given to gender mainstreaming, it is not rated high.

In any measurement including human judgment, there will always be the potential for bias and error, with different samples offering different assessments. Although matrix analytical frameworks can aid decision making, they simplify complex information and should never be used on their own. It is easy to draw conclusions from the simple visualisations that would never stand in the face of a deeper understanding of the actual programmes behind the chart. For example, in the case of the analysis of the curricula the perception of impact could change dramatically once the recommendations from the analysis are actually implemented.

Figure 7



### **Monitoring mechanisms to measure progress in the achievement of the results**

A significant 30% of the respondents of the survey were not sure that the monitoring mechanism to measure the achievements of the project are sufficiently efficient. This correlates with the mixed results that we received throughout the field mission.

It is very clear that the stakeholders place great importance in the M&E activities undertaken by the programme. Actually the local trainings on M&E provided to the core municipalities were rated by the online survey respondent as the most relevant activity to achieve the aims of the project (see BER figure 6) and emerged frequently and positively during the interviews.

Although most informants shared that enthusiasm for the M&E activities, during the evaluation we could establish that a few key stakeholders perceived M&E as another layer of management rather than its real function of being an empowering tool to enhance the achievements of the programme.

The main goal of M&E is to constantly reflect on the vertical logic of the programme and bring into light regularly the “so what?” question. Although, a great job was done at the designing stage to make sure that the implementation phases would follow the vertical logic, creating excellent tools like the M&E framework and the identification of targets, we could establish that during the implementation phase there are not enough spaces where the management and the other stakeholders reflect on the vertical logic and the quality of the products.

Another value of M&E is to collect the best practices that could then be transformed into communication products like the developing of the national award for crafts for cultural industries that it is plan for next year. More can be done in this regard to better capture the impacts of the project or lessons learnt that are now being pushed aside or lost completely.

## Sustainability

The box on the right represents what several stakeholders of the programme consider to be the road for a full ownership of the programme by national authorities. At the time of the evaluation, we could establish that there was a good level of co-financing by governmental institutions both at the state/entity level and at the local level. The level of ownership, as described under “results” was very high and most managerial decisions were shared by the government and the UN partners. The programme has also advanced in enhancing the technical capabilities of those institutions in charge of cultural and educational development in BiH and also started important legal reforms.

Therefore, at the mid-point, the programme would be placed between phase 1 and 2 of the “road to sustainability” with full ownership, co-financing and some technical capacity to take joint management decisions but with the coordination largely driven from UN agencies within UN premises.

Although, the long term horizon should always be transferring to the government, the UN team is well placed (with additions of other UN or external experts) to create a good platform with the government and with the municipalities to go to take the programme to a next phase.

### Further financing

When thinking about sustainability it is essential to think about funds further than what the programme provides. Most stakeholders interviewed see two main pockets of funds that could continue the work paved by the present programme:

- 1) Both at the state and local level there is the overwhelming consensus that the IPA funds could provide a good source for continuity. This is coherent with the general perception that the programme is a valuable contribution to EU integration process in the future.
- 2) The development of the private sector was also frequently mentioned as particularly key to give continuity to elements related with cultural tourism.

### Road map to sustainability and full national ownership

Governmental institution show  
full ownership and co-finance  
most activities



Coordination team seats within  
government institutions but  
management decisions are still  
taken jointly



All management decisions are  
taken by governmental  
institutions and UN only  
administer the funds



Governmental institutions take  
all management decisions and  
also administer the funds



All necessary resources are  
mobilized and administered by  
governmental institutions

## **Sustainability analysis by component**

### Improved policies & legal frameworks in culture and education sectors

The impact of outcome 1 has a huge potential to ensure that the results already achieved from the programme continue after the assistance has come to an end. This component has considerably developed already the capacity and the ownership of key national stakeholders. Governmental stakeholders are already beginning to identify possible future financial mechanisms such as the IPA funds that could become a flow of resources after the initiative concludes. Most importantly, this component will leave behind numerous products that are essential for enhancing institutional capacities (cultural statistics, web portal, analysis of the curricula, action plan). The influence of the regulatory framework of the action plan has the potential to exceed far beyond the life of the programme.

### Improved cross-cultural understanding at the community level

It is not an easy task at the stage of the programme to predict whether and how the achievements on improving cross-cultural understanding at the local level will be sustained after the programme comes to an end. Up until now, the trainings and exchanges on interculturalism have not demonstrated a great potential to produce lasting effects. Although as exemplified in Novo Sarajevo, the capacity development of key local champions may benefit greatly the sustainability of this outcome. Also KAP has the potential to be a key tool for measuring the changes in terms of cross-cultural understanding.

### Strengthened cultural industries

The sustainability of the achievements under this outcome would greatly depend on the suitable and relevant organizational arrangements that the programme manage to make with the private sector. It will also be important according to a number of stakeholders the quality of the capacity of development for key national partners such as local governments. The revision of the BiH regulatory framework regarding social entrepreneurship could also benefit the sustainability of this outcome but this measure is out of the scope of this programme.

### Improved tolerance levels towards diversity.

Like component 2, component 4 is mainly due for implementation during the second part of the programme. It is therefore somewhat premature to make an assessment about the sustainability of their elements. Likewise outcome 2 improving tolerance level towards diversity is a complex task and even if all the activities are implemented the results may not be extremely significant. This should not be seen as a fault of the programme. Nonetheless, the reconstruction of the three religious monuments and their potential use as symbols of tolerance and cultural understanding has a big potential to be maintained and progress after the end of the programme.



## Emerging issues

### **Gender**

The programme has internalized the importance of gender mainstreaming. They have integrated gender in most of their strategy papers and action plans. They have also made an effort to involve key institutions like the Gender Centers in the drafting of the plans. However, it seems that those efforts did not permeate through to the actual activities and stakeholders of the programme. Actually the gender trainings were rated very poorly in the BER analysis. Furthermore, the issue of gender very rarely emerged during the course of the evaluation and it seems that more efforts should be applied to make sure that the programme goes beyond being gender neutral and actually ensure it is creating a positive impact for women as well as men.

### **ICT**

Like gender, ICT was an issue that rarely emerged during the evaluation regardless of the fact that the programme has reported to have made considerable efforts putting in place ICT tools to enhance the outreach, like a Facebook profile and an e-bulletin distributed to more than 450 addresses. It appears that the ICT potential is not currently being fulfilled. A primary example is that none of the local projects examined include ICT as part of their strategy, even if they were directed to the youngest audiences.

### **Expertise of the team**

During the course of this evaluation UNESCO was mentioned by several key informants as the UN Agency better positioned to provide a substantive lead to the programme in the future as it is now developing internationally specific platforms beyond Cultural Heritage on Culture for Development. Furthermore, the team has put forward a number of outsourced tendering processes to cover for specialized consultancies needed to complement the JP team. This includes consultancies on PPP, media analysis, curricula strategy, etc.

### **Visibility of MDG-F**

An overwhelming majority of the informants mentioned spontaneously the Spanish MDG Fund as the financier of this programme. This was specified both at the state/entity level and at the local level. The fact that the agencies favored the logo of the MDG-F to their own has increased the visibility of MDG-F tremendously.

### **Quality of UN staff**

Throughout this evaluation, external and internal informants have praised the quality of UN staff on numerous occasions. The success of the programme is entirely dependent on the passion and commitment of the people who work for it. In this sense, it is fair to state that the programme would not have got to the point where it is now if it were not for the professional caliber of their staff.

## Recommendations

This section contains action points which need to be considered in consort with a constant and sound analysis of the social and policy contexts surrounding the programme.

### General recommendations

- We recommend that the PMC consider having UNESCO as the substantive lead of the JP.
- The link between the key objectives of improving the country's intercultural dynamics and the cultural industry needs to be made more explicit to all stakeholders. We recommend this to be done through an informative preamble in all public information. This includes but is not limited to the web page, the call for proposals and ToRs for experts.
- It is key that the programme reflects on mechanism to ensure nurturing the commitment given from the technical level and also from the institutional support provided by senior officials.
- In any design of an activity, the management of the programme (PMC and WG amongst others) should always ask themselves as to whether they are favouring processes over results. If that is the case, it should be made clear about why they are doing so and importantly how it would benefit the programme.
- We would suggest to commission an external study to determine why gender mainstreaming has not reached the local level and to put forward possible recommendations to resolve this issue.
- We propose that in future calls for proposals to include a criteria for the use of ICT for development, especially when directed towards a younger audience.
- When trainings are being constructed, interests should be created or identified for a given audience. It is essential that the trainees are true champions that are really going to benefit and run with the training they have received. Once the interests have been mastered, this must be followed up by an assessment of impacts on the trainees and the outcomes produced.
- We recommend that the recruitment of all international experts who contribute to specific requirements and components within the JP should always be directed by the country office.

### Monitoring and evaluation

- As was done with for outcome 1, we recommend that the programme completes the M&E framework with targets for outcomes 2, 3 and 4.
- We suggest that extra capacity is introduced to the M&E adopting a developmental evaluation approach. Specific developmental evaluation tasks such as bringing constant evaluative thought into the programme management spaces (PMC and WGs) or collecting real time information from all stakeholders keeping work requirements low should be incorporated in ToRs.
- To ensure good examples of practice such as that in Sokolac, we recommend that there be a national award that would serve not only as a motivation tool amongst all municipalities but also as a means for collecting the best practices.

### Coordination

- We suggest that the headquarters review the use and need of a National Steering Committee.

- We propose that the headquarters publicly showcases the successful case of the coordination mechanisms between the three agencies of the JP. The mechanisms include but are not limited to: the use of the shared MDG logo and a common premise. This information may benefit future programmes.
- In order to increase the flow of information, we recommend that all implementers and contractors of the programme are included in email lists that provide public information about the programme and also to encourage them to visit the programme webpage.
- To achieve potential synergies between various components of the programme we would recommend that all the ToRs for the contractors include a criteria to consider and take notice of these possible synergies.

### **Sustainability**

- We recommend that the programme engages an external consultant together with the team to design a detailed and comprehensive exit strategy to ensure the sustainability of all the components of the programme.

### **Outcome 1**

- The work of the WG on the web portal needs to be prioritized even if this incurs more resources i.e. time and finance.

### **Outcome 2**

- To reinforce and improve the articulation of the educational component and the national ownership of the programme, we recommend that the president of the educational WG or any other relevant member of the group be integrated into the PMC.
- We recommend that the work of the educational WG in implementing the recommendations of the report on the analysis of the curricula be prioritised.
- We suggest that the programme fosters a national network of practitioners committed to intercultural education which can be used in the WG space. Also UNICEF and MoCA should acquire a stronger leadership in this.
- We suggest that a workshop be facilitated externally for the educational WG so that any prior concerns can be discussed especially regarding their involvement in the educational trainings delivered by CIVITAS and their future involvement in working with the schools of the selected municipalities.
- So that the concept of “inclusion” is not misinterpreted to refer only to Roma or those with special needs, we suggest that the concept should be included and emphasised in all training programmes at the local level.
- So that the study on changes in behavioural attitudes with monitoring and measuring at regular intervals can continue, efforts should be made to institutionalise the KAP survey.
- We suggest that the three religious symbols being reconstructed be presented to the principals of the schools of the 23 municipalities involved in the programme so that they can be incorporated as an example into the intercultural teachings within the schools.

### **Outcome 3**

- For culture to be practically transformed into an economic engine for BiH, we propose the capacity development of the government in this area to be prioritised.
- The team should seek the help of UN specialised departments to take note of how other PPPs have been developed and sustained across the world to see how this can aid the creation of PPPs in BiH.
- Following on from this previous recommendation, the JP should prioritise the study and implementation of PPP.
- When designing tourism strategies and products, the programme must build on the fact that intercultural diversity is perceived to be a selling mark for prospective tourism in BiH.
- Encouragement should be given to those local projects that been created and designed around the three religious symbols to attract tourism.

#### **A last thought**

Many informants could not think of a specific recommendation for improving the programme, and just recommended that you should continue what you are doing, because it is making a difference.